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WHAT’S HUD GOT TO DO WITH IT?:  
HOW HUD’S DISPARATE IMPACT RULE 
MAY SAVE THE FAIR HOUSING ACT’S 
DISPARATE IMPACT STANDARD 
William F. Fuller* 
 
Since 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari three times on 
the question of whether disparate impact liability is cognizable under the 
Fair Housing Act (FHA).  The first two times, the parties settled.  The 
question is before the Court once again in Texas Department of Housing & 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., and this time 
the parties seem unlikely to settle. 
Disparate impact liability in the civil rights context entails liability for 
actions that have a discriminatory effect, regardless of an actor’s motive.  
Under the FHA, this can translate into liability for actions that make 
housing disproportionately unavailable for persons of a protected class or 
actions that tend to increase or maintain segregated housing patterns. 
All eleven federal circuit courts that have addressed the question agree 
that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.  In addition, in 
the spring of 2013, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) promulgated a rule that standardizes the burdens of 
proof for disparate impact claims under the FHA and specifically states for 
the first time in a formal administrative rule that disparate impact claims 
are cognizable under the FHA. 
The promulgation of HUD’s disparate impact rule means that this time 
around the Supreme Court must give heightened deference to an 
interpretation of the FHA that authorizes disparate impact claims.  This 
Note argues that despite the near-unanimity of the circuit courts’ 
interpretation of the FHA, the fate of disparate impact claims under the 
FHA was anything but certain prior to the promulgation of the HUD rule.  
The HUD rule makes it much more likely that the FHA disparate impact 
standard will survive, and this Note argues that it should. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari three times1 
on the question of whether disparate impact claims—claims brought against 
a defendant for the discriminatory effect of an action, regardless of the 
actor’s intent—are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act2 (FHA).  
However, the Supreme Court has yet to decide this question; the first two 
times, the cases settled before oral arguments could be heard.  Now, the 
issue is before the Court a third time and the parties seem unlikely to settle.3 
For the past forty years, federal circuit courts have allowed disparate 
impact claims under the FHA,4 and all eleven circuits that have decided the 
issue agree.5  In addition, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), the federal agency charged with implementing the 
FHA, has promulgated a rule that formally establishes that disparate impact 
claims can be brought under the FHA and standardizes the burdens of proof 
for the parties in such a case.6  This new rule is important because HUD’s 
interpretation of the FHA is afforded a certain amount of deference when 
the statute is under judicial review.7 
The FHA declares the policy of the federal government is “to provide, 
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United 
States.”8  To accomplish this goal, the FHA aims to (1) prevent and arrest 
 
 1. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275 
(5th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. 
Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824, cert. 
dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013); Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2012). 
 3. See Greg Stohr, Showdown Over Landmark Housing Law Looms at U.S. Supreme 
Court, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-
25/showdown-over-landmark-housing-law-looms-at-u-s-supreme-court.html. 
 4. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 
Fed. Reg. 11,459, 11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100.500). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2014); Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,474–75. 
 7. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012). 
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discrimination in housing and (2) desegregate communities within the 
United States.9 
Despite these admirable goals, housing segregation has declined only 
slightly since the passage of the FHA in 1968.10  One way to measure the 
rate of segregation in a geographical area or community is the 100-point 
“dissimilarity index,” in which a score of 100 indicates total segregation, a 
score of zero “indicat[es] a population that is randomly distributed by race,” 
and a score of sixty or higher is considered “highly segregated.”11  As of 
2000, twelve major American cities, including New York, Washington, 
D.C., Philadelphia, and Chicago, had dissimilarity indexes over eighty.12 
The causes of such de facto segregation are varied and include:  
economic factors, individual preferences of white persons to live in 
predominantly white neighborhoods, and disparate treatment of people of 
color by landlords and sellers of property.13  The effect of these conditions 
is self-perpetuating segregation and discrimination.14  Racial minorities 
living in “ghetto-like enclaves” suffer from higher rates of disease, 
unemployment, crime, and reduced educational and financial 
opportunities.15  This, in turn, has the negative effect of reinforcing 
stereotypes and reinforcing the preference of whites to live in majority-
white neighborhoods.16 
The government has played a role in perpetuating segregation and 
stereotypes by enforcing housing codes more strictly in minority-occupied 
housing,17 “providing inferior municipal services to minority 
neighborhoods[,] . . . and, perhaps the most common of all, employing 
zoning and other land-use techniques to block or limit the location of 
affordable housing developments.”18 
Disparate impact claims are often used to challenge the effects of zoning 
policies and urban redevelopment projects.  Some argue that these claims 
are vital to decreasing segregation today and preventing segregation 
patterns in the future.19  The disparate impact standard is especially 
 
 9. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 11,466; see also United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100–01 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (discussing the “dual goals” of the FHA). 
 10. See Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing:  A 
Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively Further” Mandate, 
100 KY. L.J. 125, 131 (2011). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See id. at 132. 
 13. See id. at 134–35. 
 14. See id. at 135 (“The economic/attitudinal causes of segregation and on-going 
discrimination reinforce one another.”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. In some neighborhoods, this has the effect of making affordable rental housing 
unavailable for a larger proportion of people of color. See infra notes 116–28 and 
accompanying text (discussing such an effect in Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012)). 
 18. Schwemm, supra note 10, at 136. 
 19. See Valerie Schneider, In Defense of Disparate Impact:  Urban Redevelopment and 
the Supreme Court’s Recent Interest in the Fair Housing Act, 79 MO. L. REV. 539, 576 
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important in urban redevelopment decisions—one of the main factors 
shaping U.S. cities and towns—because these decisions are usually made 
through diffuse processes in which intentional discrimination may be 
impossible to prove.20 
Considering the near unanimity21 with which federal courts and agencies 
have allowed disparate impact claims under the FHA and the arguably vital 
role disparate impact claims have in furthering the policies of the United 
States, why has the Supreme Court shown a recent interest in this issue?  
This Note aims to shine some light on this question and also addresses the 
issue of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. 
In Part I, this Note contextualizes the FHA in the social and legal 
landscape at the time of its passage.  It then defines disparate impact in the 
context of fair housing, describes the roots of this legal concept as it 
pertains to FHA claims, and shows how disparate impact claims are proven 
using the prima facie case and burden-shifting regimes of HUD’s disparate 
impact rule, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500.  Last, this part briefly describes the 
legislative history of the FHA and courts’ and commentators’ interpretation 
of that history to determine whether disparate impact liability is cognizable 
under the Act. 
Part II of this Note introduces the three cases in which the Supreme Court 
has granted certiorari on the question of whether disparate impact claims 
are cognizable under the FHA.  It then describes the development of FHA 
disparate impact case law, the precedents upon which the circuit courts 
relied, and the reasoning behind the decisions.  Next, Part II discusses two 
recent Supreme Court cases that interpret language from other civil rights 
statutes that is arguably similar to the FHA’s language.  Then, Part II 
examines how these cases have affected recent interpretations of the FHA 
and how they might affect the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FHA in 
the future.  Finally, this part discusses the limited instances in which federal 
courts have reviewed the HUD disparate impact rule. 
In Part III, this Note argues that the disparate impact standard of the FHA 
cannot stand on the prevalence or consistency of judicial precedent alone 
because the case law is rife with fundamental, logical holes.  Instead, this 
Note argues, the disparate impact standard under the FHA must rest on 
statutory interpretation alone.  Because the text of the FHA is ambiguous as 
to the cognizability of disparate impact claims, the survival of the disparate 
impact standard will rise and fall on the reasonability of HUD’s 
 
(2014) (arguing that the FHA’s success depends on a disparate impact plaintiff’s ability to 
challenge housing decisions that are made through diffuse processes in which discriminatory 
intent may be impossible to prove); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any 
Impact?  An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 411–19 (2013) (arguing that, despite the relatively low 
rate of success for individual disparate impact claims, the disparate impact standard is a vital 
tool in accomplishing the goals of the FHA). 
 20. See Schneider, supra note 19, at 576. 
 21. So far, the D.C. District Court is the only federal court to hold that disparate impact 
claims are not cognizable under the FHA. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., No. 13-00966 (RJL), 2014 WL 5802283, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2014). 
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interpretation of the statute.  Finally, this Note argues that HUD’s 
interpretation of the statute is reasonable. 
I.   THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND 
A BASIC PRIMER TO HUD’S DISPARATE IMPACT RULE 
Part I introduces the FHA by first describing the historical and legal 
contexts in which Congress passed the FHA.  This part goes on to define 
“disparate impact” and describe the historical legal development of 
disparate impact cases under the FHA. 
Next, Part I describes HUD’s disparate impact rule, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500.  
This part introduces the text of the rule and explains how the rule creates a 
burden-shifting test for determining disparate impact liability under the 
FHA.  Then, this part explains the deference standard that courts apply to 
agency rules and interpretations that implement a statute when that statute is 
under judicial review. 
Finally, this part briefly describes the use of the FHA’s legislative history 
to determine Congress’s purpose and the meaning of the FHA as it pertains 
to disparate impact claims. 
A.   An Overview of the Fair Housing Act 
This section begins by briefly painting a picture of the cultural and legal 
climate in which the FHA was enacted.  It then describes how the disparate 
impact standard functions in other areas of the law, particularly in 
constitutional equal protection and employment discrimination claims, 
which constitute the historical provenance of FHA disparate impact claims.  
Finally, this section illustrates how the FHA disparate impact standard 
functions in a practical sense by outlining the burdens of proof that each 
party bears in a FHA disparate impact claim. 
1.   The Historical Context of the Fair Housing Act 
The FHA was passed at a moment of heightened racial tension in the 
United States.22  Beginning in the mid-1960s, riots broke out in a number of 
African American urban areas.23  In response, President Lyndon Johnson 
commissioned a report on civil unrest in urban areas, known as the Kerner 
Report, which concluded that:  “Race prejudice has shaped our history 
decisively; it now threatens to affect our future.  White racism is essentially 
responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our 
cities since the end of World War II.”24  Among other things, the report 
 
 22. For a more complete discussion of the social context in which the FHA was enacted, 
see Schneider, supra note 19, at 549–53. 
 23. Id. at 552. 
 24. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS:  SUMMARY OF THE REPORT 9 (1968) 
[hereinafter KERNER REPORT]; see also Schneider, supra note 19, at 551–53 (discussing the 
effect of the Kerner Report). 
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recommended “the elimination of barriers to choice in housing and the 
passage of a national and enforceable ‘open housing law.’”25 
This report was released on March 1, 1968, in the midst of a Senate 
filibuster to block the passage of the FHA, and the report’s release acted as 
a push to garner the two-thirds vote needed to end the filibuster and pass the 
bill through the Senate on March 11, 1968.26  The assassination of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4 of the same year “served as a catalyst 
for the [FHA’s] quick passage through the House with its essential 
provisions intact.”27  President Johnson signed the FHA into law exactly 
one week after Dr. King’s assassination.28 
The year 1968 “marked the beginning of the modern era of fair housing 
law.”29  In addition to the passage of the FHA, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co.,30 the Supreme Court construed the Civil Rights Act of 186631 to 
prohibit racial discrimination in both private and public housing.32  As 
Robert G. Schwemm, a preeminent scholar in the field of fair housing law, 
notes in his treatise, Housing Discrimination Law and Litigation, the 
combined effect of the passage of the FHA and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jones meant that the private housing market would be subject to 
federal antidiscrimination laws for the first time.33 
The FHA differs from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in key ways.  First, 
the FHA extends the protections of the federal fair housing laws to personal 
traits not covered in the Civil Rights Act of 1866—which only prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race or color—such as religion, sex, familial 
status, handicap or disability, and national origin.34 
Second, the FHA expands the scope, under federal law, of the type of 
discriminatory acts that are prohibited in the housing context.  Whereas 
prior to 1968 only discrimination in the sale or rental of property was 
 
 25. Schneider, supra note 19, at 553 (quoting KERNER REPORT, supra note 24, at 23); see 
also Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything?  Protecting the Rights of Occupants Under 
the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 25 (2008). 
 26. See Schneider, supra note 19, at 553. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION, § 1:1 
(2014). 
 30. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 31. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
 32. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413; SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 1:1.  The Jones Court 
specifically dealt with the provision now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012). See Jones, 
392 U.S. at 412–13.  The Civil Rights Act of 1866 grants, inter alia, “[a]ll citizens of the 
United States . . . the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012). 
 33. SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 1:1. 
 34. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604; Jones, 392 U.S. at 413–14.  The prohibitions under the FHA, 
however, are not broader than those found in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in every sense; 
rather, they are different in scope. See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 27.  For 
example, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 may be used to create liability in cases of harassment, 
where the harassment interferes with a person’s use and enjoyment of real (and personal) 
property and is motivated by race. Id. § 27:12.  It is not always the case that liability exists 
under the FHA for acts of harassment in the housing context, even when it is motivated by 
the victim’s protected trait. See generally Oliveri, supra note 25. 
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prohibited,35 the FHA bars:  discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or 
privileges,” or “the provision of services or facilities in connection” with 
the sale or rental of a dwelling;36 the making, printing, or publishing, or 
causing to be made, printed, or published, “any notice, statement, or 
advertisement” in connection with the sale or renting of a dwelling that 
“indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination” on the basis of a 
protected trait;37 “represent[ing] to any person because of [a protected trait] 
that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such 
dwelling is in fact so available;”38 and other actions, such as discrimination 
in financing39 or brokerage services40 related to the sale or rental of a 
dwelling. 
Third, the FHA changes the way that housing discrimination statutes are 
enforced.  Whereas housing-related antidiscrimination claims under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 are enforced exclusively by private parties who 
bring suit against defendants,41 the FHA allows for enforcement of its 
substantive provisions by the U.S. Attorney General42 and the Secretary of 
HUD,43 in addition to enforcement by private parties.44 
Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this Note, whereas the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 imposes liability only for intentional 
discrimination in housing,45 courts often interpret the FHA as imposing 
liability for both intentional discrimination and acts with a discriminatory 
effect.46 
2.   Defining Disparate Impact Liability Under the Fair Housing Act 
Disparate impact liability refers to the idea that civil liability can be 
created under antidiscrimination laws for acts that have a discriminatory 
effect, regardless of an actor’s intent.47  Disparate impact liability may be 
 
 35. See, e.g., Jones, 392 U.S. at 413. 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 
 37. Id. § 3604(c). 
 38. Id. § 3604(d). 
 39. Id. § 3605. 
 40. Id. § 3606; see also Jones, 392 U.S. at 413–14 (explaining that the FHA prohibits 
many more discriminatory acts than the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
 41. Jones, 392 U.S. at 417; SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 27:21. 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (authorizing the Attorney General to “commence a civil action in 
any appropriate United States district court” in certain instances). 
 43. Id. § 3610 (authorizing the Secretary of HUD to file a housing discrimination 
complaint on his or her own initiative). 
 44. Id. (detailing procedures for an aggrieved individual to file a complaint directly with 
HUD); id. § 3613 (detailing procedures for an aggrieved individual filing a direct court 
action). 
 45. SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 27:19. 
 46. E.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 
F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014). But cf. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Dep’t 
of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 13-00966 (RJL), 2014 WL 5802283, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 
2014). 
 47. See Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact:  Doctrinal Reconstruction, 
Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 
411 (1998). 
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thought of in relation to disparate treatment, which is an act of intentional 
discrimination where “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical.”48 
The distinction between purposeful discrimination and neutral acts with a 
discriminatory effect is not always clear.  Sometimes, the disparate impact 
of an action on a protected class may be critical evidence to proving 
discriminatory intent.49  Other times, disparate impact is a stand-alone basis 
for finding a violation of a person’s civil rights.50  This second situation is 
the focus of this Note and the FHA case, Texas Department of Housing & 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,51 which is 
currently before the U.S. Supreme Court.  The sole question before the 
Court in Inclusive Communities is:  “Are disparate-impact claims 
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?”52 
3.   The Evolution of Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act 
FHA disparate impact liability is historically rooted in analogies to 
disparate impact liability in constitutional equal protection cases and Title 
VII53 employment discrimination cases.54  Today, practitioners and 
commentators prefer finding disparate impact liability by analogy to Title 
VII,55 especially because the Supreme Court no longer recognizes disparate 
impact claims in constitutional equal protection cases.56 
 
 48. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 249 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)); accord 
Mahoney, supra note 47, at 411–17 (discussing the difference between disparate treatment 
and disparate impact); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII:  An Objective 
Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (1987). 
 49. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
Justice Stevens writes: 
[T]he line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly 
as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court’s opinion 
might assume.  I agree, of course, that a constitutional issue does not arise every 
time some disproportionate impact is shown.  On the other hand, when the 
disproportion is [sufficiently dramatic] . . . it really does not matter whether the 
standard is phrased in terms of purpose or effect. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 50. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 
F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014). 
 51. 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014). 
 52. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners at i, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. 
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014) (No. 13-1371). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). 
 54. See Mahoney, supra note 47, at 425–27. 
 55. See id. at 447–50 (arguing that the Title VII analogy is the proper basis for finding 
disparate impact liability under the FHA). 
 56. See infra notes 183–91. 
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a.   Equal Protection and Its Relationship 
to Disparate Impact Liability Under the Fair Housing Act 
The first circuit court to impose disparate impact liability under the FHA 
relied almost exclusively on constitutional equal protection cases that arose 
in the context of fair housing.57 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that no 
state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”58  The Supreme Court has described the Equal Protection Clause 
as “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike.”59  This direction was extended to the federal government 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment60 in Bolling v. 
Sharpe.61  Subsequent cases tend to treat the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as imposing the same directives of equal treatment on both 
state and federal governments.62 
Constitutional equal protection claims require that the claimant show that 
the alleged bad actor acted with discriminatory intent.63  In the landmark 
Supreme Court case Washington v. Davis,64 two African American 
applicants for employment in the Washington, D.C. police department filed 
a suit against the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, among others, 
alleging that a written personnel test that operated to disqualify more 
African American applicants than white applicants violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.65  The Davis Court disagreed and held that 
constitutional equal protection plaintiffs must prove that a defendant’s 
action was motivated, at least in part, by the plaintiff’s protected trait.66 
Prior to Davis, many federal circuit courts held that disparate impact 
claims were cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.67  The Equal 
Protection Clause disparate impact standard was often applied in the 
housing context, and in some instances, federal courts relied on such 
housing discrimination cases as direct authority for finding that the FHA 
authorized disparate impact claims.68 
 
 57. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 58. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 59. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). 
 60. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 61. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 62. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213–17 (1995) 
(discussing the evolution of equal protection claims under the Fifth Amendment and 
declining to diverge from the general rule that “obligations imposed by the Fifth and the 
Fourteenth Amendments [are] indistinguishable”). 
 63. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 232–33. 
 66. Id. at 238–39. 
 67. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 68. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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b.   The Roots of the Disparate Impact Standard 
in Title VII Employment Discrimination 
and Its Effect on the Fair Housing Act 
While one can no longer prove discrimination via disparate impact in 
constitutional equal protection cases, disparate impact liability is firmly 
grounded in employment discrimination civil rights statutes.69 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,70 an employment discrimination case, the 
Supreme Court first sanctioned disparate impact liability in statutory civil 
rights law.71  In Griggs, Duke Power Co. required, as a condition to 
employment or advancement in the company, that employees pass a facially 
neutral general intelligence test or have a high school diploma.72  The 
Supreme Court held that the test requirement violated Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 196473 because it was not a business necessity and it worked 
to disqualify a disproportionately large number of African Americans.74 
The Griggs Court cited Title VII, section 703(a)(2) and 703(h), as the 
foundation for disparate impact liability under that Act.75  Section 703(a)(2) 
makes it unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify” 
employees or to “otherwise adversely affect” an employee’s status as an 
employee because of his or her race or other protected trait.76  Section 
703(h) creates an exception to this rule for “any professionally developed 
ability test provided that such test . . . is not designed, intended[,] or used to 
discriminate because of race” or other protected trait.77 
The underlying holding in Griggs, and the statutory authority on which 
the Court relied, is important to understanding disparate impact liability 
under the FHA, because the holding in Griggs would soon be adopted in 
early disparate impact cases under the FHA,78 often by direct analogy.79 
4.   The Concept of the Prima Facie Case 
It is important to note that a defendant is not liable for discrimination 
simply because he or she takes a course of action that has a disparate impact 
 
 69. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially 
Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2314 (2006) (stating that “[t]he 
theory of disparate impact acquired its firm foothold in civil rights law in” the seminal 
disparate impact in employment discrimination case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.). 
 70. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 71. See Rutherglen, supra note 69, at 2314; Rutherglen, supra note 48, at 1297. 
 72. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428. 
 73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). 
 74. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32. 
 75. See id. at 426 n.1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), e-2(h). 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 77. Id. § 2000e-2(h).  This language is identical to the earlier version quoted in Griggs. 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 n.1.  Section 703(a)(2) and (h) were cited in the first footnote, in the 
first sentence of Griggs, but the text of the statutes received little treatment after that, as the 
Court instead relied on legislative history and the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute. See 
id. at 434–36. 
 78. For a more thorough discussion of this, see infra Part II.A.2. 
 79. See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights 
II), 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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on a protected class.80  For both disparate treatment and disparate impact 
cases, without direct evidence of discriminatory intent, plaintiffs must rely 
on circumstantial evidence, governed by the prima facie case framework.81 
The prima facie frameworks for both disparate impact and disparate 
treatment claims under the FHA were adopted directly from Title VII.82  
For example, the prima facie framework for disparate treatment under the 
FHA is derived directly from the landmark Supreme Court case McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green,83 which established the prima facie case and 
burden-shifting framework for Title VII disparate treatment claims.84  For 
disparate impact claims under the FHA, the framework is again borrowed 
from Title VII, this time mirroring the disparate impact framework codified 
in section 703(k).85  HUD’s newly promulgated disparate impact rule, 
discussed below, lays out the burden-shifting framework for disparate 
impact claims under the FHA. 
B.   HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule and Chevron Deference 
This section first introduces HUD’s disparate impact rule, 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.500, by explaining how it formalizes the prima facie case and burden-
shifting framework for disparate impact claims under the FHA.  It then 
explains the reasoning behind promulgating the rule, and the need to 
formalize the disparate impact standard.  Last, this section explains how 
courts give deference to agency rules by applying the two-step test set forth 
in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.86 
1.   HUD’s Rule:  What It Says, What It Does, 
and Why It Does What It Says 
Under § 100.500, a prima facie case is established under the FHA87 by 
showing that a defendant’s action has or had a discriminatory effect.88  An 
 
 80. Cf. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 
375, 385 (2011) (stating that courts need not worry that the disparate impact approach is too 
expansive, because “the establishment of a prima facie case, by itself, is not enough to 
establish liability under the FHA.  It simply results in a more searching inquiry into the 
defendant’s motivations . . . .”). 
 81. See SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 10:2. 
 82. See id. 
 83. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 84. See id. at 802 (applying the prima facie case framework to employment 
discrimination cases under Title VII); SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 10:2 & nn.26–29 (laying 
out the prima facie case framework and collecting cases). 
 85. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012); Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,459, 11,474 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 
C.F.R. pt. 100.500) (stating that the burden-shifting scheme in HUD’s disparate impact rule 
is consistent with the effects standard in Title VII); cf. Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. v. 
Donovan, No. 13 C 8564, 2014 WL 4377570, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2014) (stating that the 
approach found in HUD’s disparate impact rule is similar to the approach found in section 
703(k)). 
 86. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 87. HUD states that § 100.500 applies to 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)–(b), 3604(f)(1)–(2), 
3605, and 3606. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,463. 
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action has a discriminatory effect when it “actually or predictably results in 
a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or 
perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of” a protected trait.89  If a 
defendant’s action has a discriminatory effect, the defendant may not be 
liable if the defendant has a “legally sufficient justification” for its action.90  
A legally sufficient justification is one that is “necessary to achieve one or 
more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests,” and cannot “be 
served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”91 
If the defendant establishes step one above—that is, that the challenged 
practice is necessary to achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
purpose—then the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that the 
practice could be served by a less discriminatory practice.92 
HUD stated that the regulation was needed “to formalize HUD’s long-
held interpretation of the availability of ‘discriminatory effects’ liability 
under the [FHA] and to provide nationwide consistency in the application 
of that form of liability.”93  There was a need to formalize the standard 
because of the various approaches that HUD and the different federal circuit 
courts of appeals took when deciding disparate impact cases under the 
FHA.94  Previously, HUD and several circuit courts applied varying three-
step burden-shifting tests; other courts used a multifactor balancing test; 
and others, still, used a mix between the two.95  At least one court applied a 
different burden to private defendants and public defendants.96 
Thus, HUD emphasized that it was not creating any new forms of 
liability but simply formalizing the standards that courts and federal 
agencies already applied in disparate impact claims.97 
2.   Chevron Deference 
HUD has the ability to standardize the framework by which federal 
courts review FHA disparate impact claims because courts are required to 
give a certain level of deference to an agency’s construction of the statute 
 
 88. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2014). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. § 100.500(b), (c)(2). 
 91. Id. § 100.500(b)(i)–(ii). 
 92. Id. § 100.500(c)(2)–(3). 
 93. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 11,460. 
 94. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 70,921, 70,923 (Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100.500). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  HUD’s standard applies equally to private and public defendants. See 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
11,476. 
 97. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 11,476 (“[T]he rule does not establish a new form of liability, but instead serves 
to formalize by regulation a standard that has been applied for decades, while providing 
nationwide uniformity of application.”). 
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that the agency is charged with administering.98  This does not mean that 
courts must automatically apply any rule that an agency creates:  under the 
Administrative Procedure Act99 (APA), courts must set aside agency action 
that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”100  This judicial review of agency action is governed 
by the two-step Chevron deference test.101 
The basic two-step test is this:  If the reviewing court is reviewing an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with 
administering, then the court must first ask “whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue,” that is, whether the statute is “silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” (Step One).102  If the 
statute speaks directly to the specific issue at hand, that is the end of the 
inquiry, “for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”103 
However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the specific question 
at issue, the court must then ask “whether the agency’s answer [or 
interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of the statute” (Step 
Two).104  At Step Two, the court must defer to the agency’s interpretation if 
it is “reasonable,” and the court may not substitute its own interpretation for 
that of the agency.105 
Thus, when a court reviews HUD’s disparate impact rule, it must ask:  
(1) whether Congress spoke directly to the precise issue of whether 
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, and (2) if not, 
whether HUD’s interpretation of the FHA as allowing such claims is 
reasonable.106 
C.   A Side Note on the Fair Housing Act’s Legislative History 
This section briefly explains the legislative history of the FHA.  
Generally speaking, for at least the past twenty-five years, courts have been 
reluctant to use legislative history to decipher the meaning of the text of a 
 
 98. E.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984). 
 99. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837; see also Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the 
Regulatory State:  An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 706 (2014) (stating 
that Chevron established the two-step Chevron deference test). 
 102. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 843. 
 105. Id. at 842–44. 
 106. See Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. v. Donovan, No. 13 C 8564, 2014 WL 
4377570, at *21, 24 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2014) (giving Chevron deference to HUD’s burden-
shifting framework but holding that HUD’s application of the rule to the insurance industry 
without adequate explanation was arbitrary and capricious, and remanding to HUD for 
further explanation). But see Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 13-00966 
(RJL), 2014 WL 5802283, at *7 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2014) (applying Chevron to HUD’s 
disparate impact rule and concluding that the rule failed at Step One, and finding, moreover, 
that HUD’s entire disparate impact rule was arbitrary and capricious). 
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statute.107  For reasons discussed below, legislative history seems even less 
desirable as a tool to determine the meaning of the FHA.108  However, 
many courts and practitioners continue to turn to the legislative history of 
the FHA as a thumb on the scale to determine legislative intent.109 
The FHA was introduced as a floor amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 
1968 after the publication of the Kerner Report on civil unrest in urban 
areas and immediately following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr.110  Because the FHA was passed as a floor amendment, it lacks 
“committee reports and other documents usually accompanying 
congressional enactments.”111 
For example, in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo,112 the Third Circuit 
recognized that Congress’s intent regarding the availability of disparate 
impact claims under the FHA was difficult to discern from its legislative 
history because the legislative history is “sketchy.”113 
Nonetheless, the court buttressed its statutory analysis of the FHA by 
stating that while the Senators debated the FHA on the floor, one senator 
“introduced an amendment that would have required proof of 
discriminatory intent to succeed in establishing a Title VIII claim,” but the 
legislators ultimately rejected this bill.114  Thus, the Rizzo court seemed to 
infer that Congress, by rejecting the proposed amendment, had in some 
form condoned the disparate impact standard under the FHA.115 
 
 107. See 2 JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION 158–60, 163–67 (Foundation Press 2013).  In discussing the controversy over 
the use of legislative history to determine the meaning of a statute, the authors note that 
“over the last quarter-century the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals have 
reduced their reliance on legislative history . . . and have placed greater emphasis on the text 
and on sources of semantic meaning, like dictionaries.” Id. at 163–64. But cf., e.g., Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 572 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Because ambiguity is apparently in the eye of the beholder, I remain convinced that it is 
unwise to treat the ambiguity vel non of a statute as determinative of whether legislative 
history is consulted.”). 
 108. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (stating that “[t]he 
legislative history of the [Fair Housing] Act is not too helpful”); Resident Advisory Bd. v. 
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he legislative history of Title VIII is somewhat 
sketchy.”); Mahoney, supra note 47, at 436 n.108 (“Because there is so little of use in the 
legislative history, courts hardly ever advert to it in construing the FHA.”); Oliveri, supra 
note 25, at 25–26 (discussing why “looking to legislative history in interpreting the FHA is 
problematic”). 
 109. Cf. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147 (citing the FHA’s legislative history to buttress its 
statutory analysis); Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,459, 11,476 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100.500) 
(“The legislative history of the Act informs HUD’s interpretation.”); Brief for Respondent at 
2–12, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., No. 13-1371 
(Dec. 17, 2014), 2014 WL 7242817 (providing extensive discussion of the legislative history 
of the FHA). 
 110. See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147 n.29; supra Part I.A.1. 
 111. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147 n.29. 
 112. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 113. Id. at 147. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Cf. id. (calling the introduction and subsequent rejection of the proposed amendment 
“significant”). 
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II.   A “DERELICT ON THE WATERS OF THE LAW”?:  
WHY THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHETHER DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS 
ARE COGNIZABLE UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
AND WHAT HUD’S GOT TO DO WITH IT 
Part II begins by discussing the three different cases in which the 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the question of whether disparate 
impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.  This part explains why the 
first two cases settled before oral arguments and why the case currently 
before the court is unlikely to settle. 
Next, Part II describes three of the original circuit court cases to hold that 
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.  This part explains 
the reasoning behind each of these cases, tracing the reasoning back along 
two lines of thought:  disparate impact liability under the Equal Protection 
Clause and under Title VII.  It then explains how these early cases each 
relied upon an analogy to equal protection cases and why such an analogy is 
no longer valid.  This part goes on to demonstrate that the survival of the 
disparate impact standard under the FHA must rely on the text of the FHA 
itself because the Supreme Court has invalidated the equal protection line of 
analysis. 
Part II then summarizes the reasoning of recent Supreme Court decisions 
that analyzed language in other civil rights statutes that is similar to the 
FHA’s text and explains how this reasoning might affect future analyses of 
the text of the FHA.  Finally, this part discusses how federal courts have 
applied Chevron to the HUD disparate impact rule and how the recent 
Supreme Court decisions have affected the Chevron analysis in one of these 
decisions. 
A.   Third Time’s the Charm?  The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari on the 
Question of Whether the FHA Authorizes Disparate Impact Liability 
The Supreme Court first granted certiorari on the question of whether 
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA in Gallagher v. 
Magner.116  In Gallagher, a number of landlords who owned or formerly 
owned multi-family housing buildings—most of which were occupied 
primarily by low-income tenants—sued the city of St. Paul, Minnesota for 
unequal enforcement of housing codes, alleging violations of the FHA117 
for both disparate treatment and disparate impact on the basis of race and 
ethnicity.118  The director of St. Paul’s Department of Neighborhood 
Housing and Property Improvement specifically increased housing code 
enforcement on rental properties to raise revenue and “for the sake of the 
neighborhood.”119  The district court dismissed both claims, and the 
plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit.120  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
 
 116. 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2012). 
 118. Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 830. 
 119. Id. at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120. Id. 
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dismissal of the disparate treatment claim121 but reversed and remanded the 
disparate impact claim to the district court, because St. Paul’s unequal 
enforcement of the housing code made housing unavailable or more 
expensive for a disproportionately large number of African American 
residents compared to white residents.122 
St. Paul appealed from the remand on the disparate impact claim and 
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on two questions: 
1. Are disparate-impact claims cognizable under the Fair Housing Act? 
2. If such claims are cognizable, should they be analyzed under the 
burden-shifting approach used by three circuits, under the balancing test 
used by four circuits, under a hybrid approach used by two circuits, or by 
some other test?123 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on only the first question.124 
However, the city withdrew its petition,125 and the Supreme Court never 
heard oral arguments on Gallagher.126  Allegedly, at the request of the 
Obama Administration,127 St. Paul agreed to withdraw its petition in 
exchange for the Department of Justice declining to intervene in a civil 
fraud suit alleging that St. Paul had defrauded the federal government of 
millions of dollars in community development funds.128 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on this question a second time in 
Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly.129  
In Mt. Holly, the Township of Mount Holly, New Jersey had created a 
redevelopment plan known as “the Gardens.”130  The Gardens was the only 
neighborhood in all of Mount Holly that was mostly comprised of 
minorities,131 and the 2000 census classified nearly all residents of the 
Gardens as “low income,” with most being classified as “very low” or 
“extremely low” income.132  The redevelopment plan called for the 
demolition of all of the housing then in place, and the replacement of the 
 
 121. Id. at 831–33, 845.  One plaintiff was able to point to specific racially derogatory 
comments made by code enforcement officers and police officers when visiting his property, 
but the plaintiffs failed to bring these comments to the attention of the trial judge. Id. at 832. 
 122. Id. at 837–38, 845. 
 123. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioner at i, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 
548 (2012) (No. 10-1032). 
 124. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548. 
 125. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (dismissing writ of certiorari). 
 126. See, e.g., Trevor Burrus, How Mischievous Obama Administration Officials Scuttled 
an Important Supreme Court Case, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/trevorburrus/2013/09/02/how-mischievous-obama-
administration-officials-scuttled-an-important-supreme-court-case/. 
 127. See Stohr, supra note 3; cf. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 
113TH CONG., ET AL., DOJ’S QUID PRO QUO WITH ST. PAUL:  HOW ASSISTANT ATTORNEY 
GENERAL THOMAS PEREZ MANIPULATED JUSTICE AND IGNORED THE RULE OF LAW 1 (2013) 
[hereinafter DOJ’S QUID PRO QUO]. 
 128. DOJ’S QUID PRO QUO, supra note 127, at 1. 
 129. 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824, cert. dismissed, 134 S. 
Ct. 636 (2013). 
 130. Id. at 379. 
 131. Id. at 377. 
 132. Id. at 378. 
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houses with 520 new housing units—fifty-six of which would be deed-
restricted affordable housing units, and eleven of those fifty-six to be 
offered on a priority basis for current residents.133  Relocation funds of up 
to $7,500 per family were authorized, but most could not afford to live in 
the Township of Mount Holly any longer.134  The township began to 
acquire and demolish houses in the area in 2008 and, by summer of 2009, 
the township had demolished nearly 200 buildings, with even more being 
left vacant or severely damaged by the demolition process.135 
In May 2008, an association of the Gardens’ residents filed suit in federal 
court, alleging, among other things, violations of the FHA because of the 
disproportionate negative effect that the redevelopment plan had on persons 
of color.136  On appeal from a grant of summary judgment for the defendant 
township, the Third Circuit concluded that the residents had made a prima 
facie case and deserved to have their claims heard on the merits.137 
The township petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on 
the same two questions138 that were presented in Gallagher.139  Again, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari only to the first:  whether disparate impact 
claims are cognizable under the FHA.140 
However, this case also settled before oral arguments could be heard, this 
time allegedly at the behest of civil rights advocacy groups.141  Again, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari and the question remained 
unanswered.142 
This issue is before the Supreme Court again in a 2014 case from the 
Fifth Circuit, Inclusive Communities.  In this case, the nonprofit community 
group Inclusive Communities Project (ICP) sued the Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) for “maintaining and 
perpetuating segregated housing patterns” through its distribution of low-
income housing tax credits (LIHTCs).143  The LIHTC program is a federal 
tax credit program administered by state agencies, which gives tax credits to 
developers of affordable housing.144  LIHTCs are distributed by TDHCA to 
developers through a competitive program, and these credits can be sold off 
by the developer to finance low-income housing projects.145  ICP alleges 
 
 133. Id. at 379. 
 134. Id. at 380. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 380–81. 
 137. Id. at 385. 
 138. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2824 (2013); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioner at i, Mt. Holly, 133 S. Ct. 2824. 
 140. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioner at i, Mt. Holly, 133 S. Ct. 2824. 
 141. Cf. Adam Liptak, Housing Case Is Settled Before It Goes to Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2013, at A18; Stohr, supra note 3 (implying that civil rights groups were 
behind the settlement). 
 142. See Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
636 (2013) (dismissing writ of certiorari). 
 143. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275, 
278 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014). 
 144. See I.R.C. § 42 (2012); Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 747 F.3d at 277. 
 145. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 747 F.3d at 277. 
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that TDHCA has granted LIHTCs to developers for projects in minority-
concentrated neighborhoods at a disproportionate rate and denied LIHTCs 
in predominately white neighborhoods at a disproportionate rate, thereby 
creating a concentration of low-income housing in minority-concentrated 
neighborhoods and maintaining patterns of segregation.146 
The district court held in favor of ICP on the FHA disparate impact 
claim,147 and TDHCA appealed.148  On appeal, the primary question was 
which standard should be applied in disparate impact claims under the 
FHA.149  The district court applied the standard found in Huntington 
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,150 which places the burden on the 
defendant to “(1) justify [its] actions with a compelling governmental 
interest and (2) prove that there were no less discriminatory alternatives.”151 
However, between the time that the district court decided the case and the 
time that the Fifth Circuit heard the appeal, HUD finalized its disparate 
impact rule, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, which establishes that the plaintiff bears 
the burden of showing less discriminatory alternatives.152  The Fifth Circuit 
declined to follow Huntington Beach and instead applied the test in 
§ 100.500.153 
Again, the defendants appealed, but this time petitioning the Supreme 
Court for certiorari on the same two questions presented in Gallagher and 
Mt. Holly.154  Again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on only the first 
question:  whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the 
FHA.155 
This time, it seems unlikely that the case will settle.156  Michael Daniel, a 
lawyer for ICP, stated that ICP has no intention of withdrawing the 
complaint, and that ICP “can make its case before the Supreme Court.”157 
B.   How We Got to Where We Are Today:  
An Analysis of the Validity of the Underlying Reasoning 
in Early FHA Disparate Impact Cases 
This section discusses in detail the reasoning behind the first three federal 
circuit court decisions to address the question of whether disparate impact 
claims are cognizable under the FHA.  This section then explains how the 
survival of the disparate impact standard under the FHA must rest on the 
 
 146. Id. at 278. 
 147. Id. at 276. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 151. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 747 F.3d at 279 (citing Huntington Branch, 822 F.2d at 
939). 
 152. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 153. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 747 F.3d at 282–83. 
 154. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners at i, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. 
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014). 
 155. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 46. 
 156. Stohr, supra note 3. 
 157. Id. 
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text of the statute itself—something that can be demonstrated with close 
textual analysis and analogies to the text of employment discrimination 
statutes that have elsewhere been held to authorize disparate impact claims. 
1.   Early Disparate Impact Decisions Under the FHA Relied 
on an Invalid Legal Theory Under the Equal Protection Clause 
In 1974, the Eighth Circuit decided United States v. City of Black 
Jack,158 the first federal circuit court case to impose liability under the FHA 
based solely on a theory of disparate impact.159  The facts underlying Black 
Jack are typical of what Professor Stacy Seicshnaydre describes as a 
“housing barrier” case,160 or a case in which the challenged practice erects a 
barrier to integrating neighborhoods.161  In Black Jack, a coalition of 
residents in a formerly unincorporated neighborhood petitioned St. Louis 
county for incorporation after learning that a low-income housing complex 
had been approved for an undeveloped plot of land in the neighborhood.162  
The residents succeeded in incorporating the neighborhood and founded the 
City of Black Jack—a city that was ninety-nine percent white, in stark 
contrast to surrounding neighborhoods in the St. Louis metropolitan area.163  
Within one week after the City of Black Jack’s municipal authority went 
into effect, the city began hearings on a new zoning ordinance that would 
prohibit any new multifamily dwellings from being built within the city’s 
limits and would make any then-existing multifamily dwellings 
“nonconforming.”164  Within one month from the start of the hearings, the 
city council of Black Jack approved and enacted the ordinance.165 
The United States sued the City of Black Jack, alleging both disparate 
treatment and disparate impact violations under the FHA.166  The district 
court found that the plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts to overcome 
their burden of persuasion for either claim, but the Eighth Circuit reversed 
and remanded with respect to the disparate impact claim and ordered the 
district court to permanently enjoin the enforcement of the zoning 
ordinance.167 
The Eighth Circuit made two pertinent analytical choices in Black Jack:  
(1) it established the prima facie framework applied in FHA disparate 
impact claims,168 and (2) it relied directly on equal protection precedent in 
 
 158. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 159. See Mahoney, supra note 47, at 427–28; Schneider, supra note 19, at 558. 
 160. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 19, at 365. 
 161. See id. at 361. 
 162. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1182. 
 163. Id. at 1183. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See generally United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Mo. 
1974). 
 167. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1188. 
 168. Id. at 1184. 
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holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA without 
any statutory analysis.169 
The Black Jack court’s conclusion that the “burden of proof in [FHA] 
cases is governed by the concept of the ‘prima facie case’”170 can be traced 
indirectly to Title VII case law.  The two cases the court cites for its 
conclusion are Griggs171 and Williams v. Matthews Co.172 
The basic reasoning in Williams is that, because the concept of the prima 
facie case governs in disparate treatment claims under Title VII,173 so too 
should it govern actions under the FHA.174  In Williams, the Eighth Circuit 
adopted the disparate treatment burden-shifting regime directly from the 
Supreme Court case McDonnell Douglas Corp.175 
Six months later, the Eighth Circuit decided Black Jack and cited to 
Williams for the proposition that the burden of proof in FHA cases is 
governed by the concept of the prima facie case.176  However, instead of 
citing Griggs177 for the proposition that a prima facie case can be 
established with a showing of a disparate impact—which would have 
paralleled the reasoning in Williams—it instead cited to a number of equal 
protection cases that were brought in the context of fair housing.178 
The Black Jack court relied directly on equal protection precedent in 
finding disparate impact liability under the FHA.179  As Peter E. Mahoney 
notes in his article:  “The [equal protection] cases were not referred to by 
analogy.  The Court based its holding squarely upon them, without any 
attempt to explain the leap from constitutional to statutory bases.”180  To 
understand why the court relied solely on equal protection cases while 
simultaneously eschewing statutory analysis of the FHA,181 one should note 
 
 169. Id. at 1184–87; Mahoney supra note 47, at 428–29 & 428 n.65 (collecting cases 
upon which the Black Jack court relied). 
 170. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184 (quoting Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 
(8th Cir. 1974)). 
 171. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
 172. 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 173. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Williams, 499 F.2d at 826 (“We think that the concept of the ‘prima facie case’ 
applies to discrimination in housing as much as to discrimination in other areas of life.” 
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973))). 
 175. See supra notes 83–84; see also Williams, 499 F.2d at 827 (adopting prima facie 
case framework from McDonell Douglas and applying it to FHA disparate treatment claim). 
 176. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184. 
 177. This may be explained simply by the fact that Griggs makes no mention of the prima 
facie case. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 178. See Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184–85; infra note 182. 
 179. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184–87; see also Mahoney supra note 47, at 428–29 & 428 
n.65 (collecting cases upon which the Black Jack court relied). 
 180. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 429 n.71. 
 181. Id. at 428. “Indeed, Black Jack lacks any substantive analysis of the language of the 
FHA or of the employment law disparate impact cases, focusing instead on a balancing test 
derived wholly from the constitutional cases.” Id.; accord Kirk D. Jensen & Jeffrey P. 
Naimon, The Fair Housing Act, Disparate Impact Claims, and Magner v. Gallagher:  An 
Opportunity to Return to the Primacy of the Statutory Text, 129 BANKING L.J. 99, 125–26 
(2012); Andrew L. Sandler & Kirk D. Jensen, Disparate Impact in Fair Lending:  A Theory 
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that all of the equal protection cases upon which the Black Jack court relied 
arose in the housing context, although only some included an FHA 
claim.182 
However, complete reliance on these cases as direct authority turned out 
to be problematic.183  Several years later, in Washington v. Davis, the 
Supreme Court directly overturned three of the cases relied upon in Black 
Jack and overturned the rest of the cases relied upon in Black Jack by 
implication.184  In Davis, the Court rejected a disparate impact standard of 
liability under the Equal Protection Clause in the context of employment 
discrimination.185  The next year—in Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.186—the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its rejection of disparate impact liability under the Equal 
Protection Clause but this time specifically in the fair housing context.187 
Arlington Heights came to the Supreme Court on appeal from Arlington 
Heights I,188 in which the Seventh Circuit held that the Village of Arlington 
Heights’s refusal to rezone property sought to be developed by the plaintiff 
had a disparate impact on people of color, and therefore violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.189  Citing Washington v. 
Davis, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its view that disparate impact claims 
are not cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.190 
 
Without a Basis & the Law of Unintended Consequences, 33 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 
POL’Y REP. 18, 18 (2014). 
 182. Many of the cases that the Black Jack court relied on lacked a FHA component or 
the courts gave the FHA claims cursory treatment. See United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. 
Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 801–02 (5th Cir. 1974) (refusal by 
municipality to offer sewer services to housing project occupied mostly by African 
Americans and Hispanic residents; FHA claim given cursory treatment); Hawkins v. Town 
of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971) (discriminatory impact in availability of 
municipal services; no FHA component), aff’d en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (1972); Kennedy 
Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 109 (2d Cir. 1970) (discriminatory 
impact of zoning ordinances; FHA claim brought, but not discussed, and FHA claim not 
decided); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1038 (10th Cir. 1970) (discriminatory 
impact of zone change; no FHA component or claim); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk 
Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 923 (2d Cir. 1968) (discriminatory impact of 
redevelopment project; no FHA claim); Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 362 
F. Supp. 651, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (discriminatory effect analysis under Equal Protection 
Clause for failed city housing project; FHA claim given cursory treatment), aff’d, 507 F.2d 
1065 (2d Cir. 1974); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1177, 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1972) 
(revocation of public housing building permits denied plaintiffs equal protection; no FHA 
claim, and no FHA analysis, but FHA said to be violated because of a denial of equal 
protection). 
 183. See Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 125–27; Mahoney, supra note 47, at 429–
31; Sandler & Jensen, supra note 181, at 18. 
 184. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 429–30. 
 185. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 186. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 187. See id. at 264–65, 268; Mahoney, supra note 47, at 430. 
 188. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights I), 517 
F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 189. Id. at 415. 
 190. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264–65. 
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Therefore, within a few short years of the Black Jack decision, the 
Supreme Court not only invalidated the majority of the law on which the 
Black Jack decision relied, but also held that this authority remained invalid 
within the specific context of fair housing.  As Mahoney succinctly states:  
“The Supreme Court’s unmistakable rejection of the disparate impact 
theory of equal protection liability cut Black Jack from its constitutional 
moorings, apparently rendering its holding, within eighteen months, a 
‘derelict on the waters of the law.’”191 
The Seventh Circuit did not decide the FHA claim in Arlington Heights 
I.192  Thus, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether the 
FHA authorized disparate impact liability.193  Instead, on remand, and the 
Seventh Circuit, in Arlington Heights II,194 once again found that the 
Village of Arlington Heights had engaged in discrimination under a theory 
of disparate impact, but this time, it found that Arlington Heights was liable 
under section 804(a) of the FHA.195 
2.   Arlington Heights II and Rizzo:  A Mixed Bag 
Along with Black Jack, two subsequent cases decided in 1977, Arlington 
Heights II and Rizzo, are sometimes discussed as the three “original FHA 
disparate impact cases.”196  Unlike the Black Jack court, the Arlington 
Heights II court and the Rizzo court engaged in a statutory analysis of 
section 804(a).197  Both cases display similar reasoning198 and, thus, will be 
discussed together. 
In Rizzo, the City of Philadelphia displaced a number of African 
American families after it condemned and razed a portion of a five-block 
radius in the majority-white community of Whitman.199  The Philadelphia 
Housing Authority had planned to build a public housing complex on that 
site, but after facing community resistance, the mayor and the city’s 
agencies withdrew that plan even after the developer had begun 
construction.200  Resident Advisory Board, a community group that 
 
 191. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 430 (quoting Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 
U.S. 341, 356 (1951)). 
 192. Arlington Heights I, 517 F.2d 409; see also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 271 
(referring to the Seventh Circuit’s “unorthodox” resolution of the case based on the 
constitutional claim and not the statutory claim); Mahoney, supra note 47, at 432 (referring 
to the case on appeal as having an “inverted procedural status”). 
 193. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 271. 
 194. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 195. Id. at 1288. 
 196. Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 128; see also Mahoney, supra note 47, at 427–
439 (referring to Black Jack, Arlington Heights II, and Rizzo as the original cases to hold that 
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA). 
 197. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146–48 (3d Cir. 1977); Arlington 
Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1288–89. 
 198. But cf. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 436 (stating that Rizzo is the first circuit court 
case to place “primary analytic reliance” on Title VII cases). 
 199. See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 129–32. 
 200. See id. at 132, 134–36. 
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supported the project, sued.201  The district court found that the city and its 
mayor had intentionally discriminated against African Americans202 in 
violation of the FHA and that its agencies and HUD had violated the FHA 
under a disparate impact theory because of the discriminatory effect of their 
actions.203  On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed in all respects and 
clarified that the disparate impact violation occurred under section 
804(a).204 
Both the Rizzo and Arlington Heights II courts began their statutory 
analyses by recognizing that a narrow reading of the phrase “because of 
race” found in section 804(a) of the FHA could act as an obstacle to reading 
the text of the FHA as authorizing disparate impact claims.205  However, 
both courts opted for the broader reading of the “because of” language.206  
The Arlington Heights II court reasoned that a defendant can commit an act 
“because of” race “whenever the natural and foreseeable consequence of 
that act is to discriminate between races, regardless of . . . intent.”207 
First, both courts turned to the Griggs analysis of Title VII, which 
contains the same “because of [protected trait]” formulation208 found in the 
FHA.209  The Arlington Heights II court read Griggs as authorizing 
disparate impact liability under Title VII “in spite of the ‘because of race’ 
language” found in section 703(h).210  The Rizzo court also found it 
significant that the presence of the same “because of” language in Title VII 
was not a barrier to the Griggs Court authorizing disparate impact claims 
under that Title.211 
Next, both the Arlington Heights II and the Rizzo courts focused on 
Griggs’s emphasis on the “broad purposes underlying [Title VII],”212 in 
finding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under that Title.213  
Both courts reasoned that the FHA had similarly broad remedial 
purposes,214 and thus the broad purposes of the FHA were sufficient to 
overcome the obstacle that the “because of” language presented.215  
Therefore, both the Arlington Heights II court and the Rizzo court 
emphasized the similarities between the remedial purposes of both Title VII 
 
 201. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
 202. See id. at 1025 (finding that the city had intentionally discriminated against the 
plaintiffs, the district court pointed to the fact that Rizzo “considered public housing to be 
Black housing and took a stand against placing such housing in White neighborhoods”). 
 203. Id. at 1022–24, 1026. 
 204. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 130.  The Third Circuit also did not “find it necessary to 
determine precisely which provision of Title VII the City violated.” Id. at 140 n.21. 
 205. Id. at 146; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 206. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 146–47; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1288. 
 207. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1288. 
 208. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 209. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289. 
 210. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289. 
 211. See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147. 
 212. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289 n.6. 
 213. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289. 
 214. See infra notes 263–66. 
 215. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289. 
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and the FHA in overcoming statutory language that might otherwise point 
to liability only for intentional discrimination.216 
However, both the Arlington Heights II and the Rizzo courts buttressed 
their reasoning by citing “a number of courts [that agree].”217  These 
agreeing courts did not rely so much on a statutory analysis of the FHA or 
an analogy to Title VII but instead tended to rely upon equal protection 
cases or FHA disparate treatment cases.218  Of the four cases that the 
Arlington Heights II court cited, two relied on equal protection disparate 
impact cases,219 one was a disparate treatment FHA case,220 and the fourth 
was Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo221 while it was still in the district 
court, which relied heavily on an equal protection analysis adopted from 
Black Jack.222  The Rizzo court cited the exact same cases that the Arlington 
Heights II court cited, except, where Arlington Heights II cited Rizzo in the 
district court, Rizzo cited to Arlington Heights II.223  Accordingly, some 
commentators have argued that the reasoning in both Arlington Heights II 
and Rizzo is weakened by these citations, or at least that such citations add 
little to the analysis.224 
Despite this apparent logical flaw in Black Jack, Arlington Heights II, 
and Rizzo, many modern courts continue to cite these cases as authoritative 
or persuasive precedent for the conclusion that the FHA authorizes 
disparate impact claims.225  For example, in Inclusive Communities—the 
FHA disparate impact case now before the Supreme Court—the Fifth 
Circuit cited eight different cases in support of the determination that 
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Act.226  One of these cases 
is Arlington Heights II.227  Of the seven other cases, six cite Arlington 
Heights II, five cite Rizzo, and three cite Black Jack as support for applying 
 
 216. But cf. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 433, 436 (stating that Arlington Heights II relied 
mostly on equal protection cases and Rizzo relied mostly on a Title VII analogy). 
 217. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1290; see also Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148 n.31. 
 218. See infra notes 219–23; accord Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 128 (noting 
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 219. See Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 
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their “constitutional right of ‘freedom from discrimination by the States in the enjoyment of 
property rights’” (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948))).  The Supreme Court 
explicitly overturned Kennedy Park Homes in Arlington Heights. See Vill. of Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 n.16 (1977); Mahoney, supra note 
47, at 433. 
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 221. 425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
 222. See id. at 1022; Mahoney, supra note 47, at 433. 
 223. See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148 n.31 (citing Arlington Heights II, Smith, Black Jack, and 
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 224. See Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 125; Mahoney, supra note 47, at 429. 
 225. See Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 128–29. 
 226. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 
275, 280 n.4 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014). 
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the disparate impact standard.228  Each case, except for one, cites at least 
two of the three, and one cites all three.229 
C.   Recent Supreme Court Cases Which Arguably Undermine 
Reading the Text of the FHA As Authorizing Disparate Impact Claims 
Some argue that the reasoning in Arlington Heights II and Rizzo—insofar 
as they rely on the text of the FHA and an analogy to Title VII—also has 
been effectively rejected by the Supreme Court in a number of recent 
cases.230  First, this section explains that the Supreme Court interprets 
statutes that have the same language and similar purposes as having a 
consistent meaning.  Next, this section discusses the Supreme Court’s 
recent interpretation of the key language in several relevant civil rights 
statutes:  the “otherwise adversely affect” language in Title VII and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act231 (ADEA); and the 
discriminate/adversely affect “because of” a protected trait language in the 
same statutes.  Finally, this section lays out how scholars and courts have 
attempted to apply these recent Supreme Court provisions to arguably 
similar provisions in the FHA. 
Smith v. City of Jackson232 is often cited as being the first Supreme Court 
case to seriously call into question the analogies between the FHA and Title 
VII.233  Smith is a four-to-one-to-three plurality decision in which the Court 
held that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA.234  In 
doing so, the Smith Court analyzed the language in section 4(a)(1) and 
 
 228. See Mt. Holly Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 381, 
384 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Rizzo and Black Jack); Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 833, 
836 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 
(2012) (citing Arlington Heights II and Black Jack); Graoch Assocs. #33, L. P. v. 
Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 383 & n.3 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (citing Arlington Height II and Rizzo); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 
F.3d 43, 49 & nn.3–4 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Arlington Heights II and Rizzo); Mountain Side 
Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(citing Arlington Heights II and Rizzo); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 
844 F.2d 926, 934–35 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Arlington Heights II, Black Jack, and Rizzo); 
Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Arlington Heights 
II). 
 229. See supra  note 228. 
 230. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 231. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012). 
 232. 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
 233. Cf. Michael G. Allen, Jamie L. Crook & John P. Relman, Assessing HUD’s 
Disparate Impact Rule:  A Practitioner’s Perspective, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 157 
(2014) (stating that the decision in Smith has “reignited” challenges to the disparate impact 
standard under the FHA, particularly by attempting to draw distinctions between the 
language of Title VII and ADEA on one side and the FHA on the other); Jensen & Naimon, 
supra note 181, at 100 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII in Smith 
“makes clear that the anti-discrimination provisions of the FHA do not permit disparate 
impact claims”). But cf. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact, 49 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 125, 149 & n.156 (2014) (arguing that the “otherwise make 
unavailable or deny” language found in the FHA establishes a “results test,” and that the 
holding in Smith supports this view). 
 234. Smith, 544 U.S. at 243.  Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision of this 
case. Id. 
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(a)(2) of the ADEA in the context of an EEOC regulation that arguably 
created a disparate impact standard under section 4(a).235 
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court for Parts I, II, and IV, 
in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Scalia joined.236  The 
plurality’s opinion in Part III analyzes the text of section 4(a)(1) and (a)(2), 
and it focuses largely on the Griggs Court’s interpretation of Title VII.237  
The plurality makes clear that the reason that the reading in Griggs is 
correct is because section 703(a)(2) makes it unlawful to “otherwise 
adversely affect” an individual’s employment status because of a protected 
trait—language that section 703(a)(1) does not contain.238 
Justice Scalia did not join Part III of the opinion, but wrote in his 
concurrence that although he “agree[s] with all of the Court’s reasoning” as 
to Part III, he would prefer to defer to the EEOC’s disparate impact rule 
under a Chevron analysis.239 
The dissent, in which three Justices joined, also analyzed the text of the 
statute but reached a different conclusion.240  The dissent agreed that the 
language in section 4(a)(1) does not authorize disparate impact claims, but 
the dissent also argued that section 4(a)(2) does not support such claims 
either.241 
The dissent in Smith reasoned that the language “because of [protected 
trait]” was the decisive language in the statute, and that this language forced 
a reading of the statute that only authorizes disparate treatment claims.242  
Citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary from 1961, Justice 
O’Connor argued that “because of” plainly means to act “by reason of” or 
“on account of” an individual’s age, and that this inescapably premises 
liability under the ADEA on a defendant’s discriminatory intent.243  Just as 
parallel language should be read consistently among different titles of the 
United States Code,244 Justice O’Connor argued that the parallel use of the 
“because of” language in section 703(a)(1) and (a)(2) should be read as 
having the same meaning.245  She argued that the language “because of” is 
 
 235. See id.at 243–47 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the EEOC rule created a 
disparate impact standard under section 4(a)(2)). But see id. at 263–66 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the EEOC rule in question does not apply to section 4(a)).  See 
infra note 261 and accompanying text for the full text of the relevant portions of the parallel 
provisions of Title VII.  The text of these provisions of Title VII is identical to the provisions 
of the ADEA discussed here, except substitute “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” 
with “age,” and omit “or applicants for employment.” Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2), with 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 236. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 229 (plurality opinion). 
 237. See id. at 233–34. 
 238. See id. at 245–46 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 239. See id. at 243. 
 240. See id. 247–68 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 241. See id. at 248–51. 
 242. See id. at 250. 
 243. Id. at 249. 
 244. Cf. id. at 233–34 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (arguing that, because ADEA was 
derived in haec verba from Title VII, the parallel provisions of these two statutory schemes 
should be read to have meanings consistent with each other). 
 245. See id. at 249–50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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“precisely the same” in both section 703(a)(1) and (a)(2), and that to read 
one subsection as foreclosing disparate impact claims, and the other as 
authorizing them, would give the words in the text different meanings.246  If 
Justice O’Connor’s reading of the plain meaning of “because of” is correct, 
this could have major implications for the interpretation of the FHA, which 
contains the “because of” language, but does not contain the exact 
“otherwise adversely affect”247 language thought to redeem disparate 
impact claims under Title VII and the ADEA.248 
Justice O’Connor’s reading of the “because of” language in her Smith 
dissent has received support from some of the Court’s subsequent decisions, 
perhaps most notably in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.249 
Gross is a five-to-four decision in which the Court decided that the 
disparate treatment provision of the ADEA required that age be a but-for 
cause of the employer’s decision to take an adverse employment action.250  
This holding itself does not actually affect disparate impact cases under the 
FHA, but how the Court came to its conclusion is significant. 
The Court began its analysis of the text by explaining that “[s]tatutory 
construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the 
assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses 
the legislative purpose.”251 
The Court then analyzed the “ordinary meaning” of the phrase “because 
of.”252  The Court cited three dictionaries for the proposition that the 
phrase’s plain meaning is “by reason of” or “on account of.”253  Thus, 
under the disparate treatment statute, section 4(a)(1), the plain meaning of 
“discriminate . . . because of age,” is that age must be the reason that an 
employer decided to act—that is, age must be a but-for cause of the 
action.254 
The Gross Court’s interpretation of “because of” is rather narrow,255 and 
it could be an indication of how narrowly the Court might interpret the plain 
meaning of “because of” in the FHA when the Court decides Inclusive 
Communities.  As early as Arlington Heights II, courts recognized that the 
“because of” language found in section 804(a)256 of the FHA, if read 
narrowly, could be problematic for bringing disparate impact claims under 
 
 246. See id. at 250. 
 247. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 248. Cf. Smith, 544 U.S. at 236 (plurality opinion). 
 249. 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 250. See id. at 176. 
 251. Id. at 175–76 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 
U.S. 246, 252 (2004)). 
 252. See id. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. 
 255. Cf. Meghan C. Cooper, Comment, Reading Between the Lines:  The Supreme 
Court’s Textual Analysis of the ADEA in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 45 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 753, 770–72 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s interpretation of the ADEA’s 
“because of” language overturned prior precedent and placed an “[u]nfair and [i]llogical” 
burden on plaintiffs bringing ADEA claims). 
 256. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012). 
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the Act.257  This ongoing debate continues to incite rebukes and defenses of 
disparate impact claims among litigants and commentators. 
D.   The Effect of Smith and Gross on the FHA 
This section explains how Smith and Gross have already affected 
interpretations of the FHA.  This section also examines the opposing 
viewpoints of those who argue that the decisions in Smith and Gross have 
had no effect on a reading of the FHA that would authorize disparate impact 
claims, versus those who argue that Smith and Gross preclude a reading of 
the FHA as authorizing disparate impact claims. 
As indicated above,258 it is common for commentators and courts to 
argue that the text of the FHA does or does not authorize disparate impact 
claims by conducting a close textual analysis of the FHA and comparing the 
language of the FHA to the language of Title VII.259 
A complete discussion of these provisions requires that the two statutes 
be reproduced side by side, in full: 
Fair Housing Act: 
section 804. . . . it shall be unlawful— 
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after making a bona fide offer, or to refuse to 
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, 
a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status, or national origin. 
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or 
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status, or national origin.260 
Title VII: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.261 
 
 257. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra Part II.B. 
 259. Cf. Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 108 (comparing the text of Title VII, the 
ADEA, and the FHA, and showing alleged presence of “disparate treatment” language); 
Schneider, supra note 19, at 564–67 (comparing the language in Title VII and the ADEA to 
the language in the FHA). 
 260. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b). 
 261. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2). 
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1.   The Proponents’ Arguments 
Proponents of the FHA disparate impact standard often argue that the 
FHA and Title VII are sufficiently similar in language and structure to 
warrant the conclusion that the FHA authorizes disparate impact claims.262 
This argument tends to begin with a statement of the FHA’s purpose:  “It 
is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional 
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”263  This purpose 
is often read as giving the FHA’s language a generous construction, and the 
FHA as a whole, a “‘broad and inclusive’ compass.”264  Recall that both the 
Rizzo and Arlington Heights II courts reasoned that the broad remedial 
purposes of the FHA were sufficient to overcome the argument that certain 
language in the FHA should be read narrowly to preclude disparate impact 
claims.265 
Thus, when the FHA states that it is unlawful to “otherwise make 
unavailable or deny” a dwelling to a person on the basis of a person’s 
protected trait, courts and commentators read this language broadly as 
making acts with a discriminatory effect unlawful.266 
This language, the argument goes, is sufficiently similar to the language 
“otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee”267 in section 
703(a)(2) of Title VII to conclude that the FHA also authorizes disparate 
impact claims.268  As Part II.B discusses, the Smith Court confirmed that it 
is this language in section 703(a)(2) that gives rise to disparate impact 
liability. 
It is argued that both the “otherwise make unavailable” language under 
the FHA and the “otherwise adversely affect” language of Title VII and the 
ADEA focus on the “potential discriminatory impacts of actions.”269  While 
the “affects” language in Title VII and ADEA might be “more explicit” 
than the language in the FHA, both focus on the unwanted effect on the 
protected person.270 
 
 262. See infra notes 266–73 and accompanying text. 
 263. 42 U.S.C. § 3601; see also Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 
1977); Schneider, supra note 19, at 566. 
 264. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995) (quoting 
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)); see also Schneider, supra 
note 19, at 566; cf. Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc. 759 F.3d 140, 158 (2d Cir. 2014) (according 
the term “aggrieved person” under the FHA the broadest construction “as is permitted by 
Article III of the Constitution” (quoting Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209)). 
 265. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 266. See Johnson, supra note 233, at 149 & n.156 (arguing that the “otherwise make 
unavailable or deny” language found in the FHA establishes a “results test”); Schneider, 
supra note 19 at 566; cf. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 
658 F.3d 375, 381 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert. dismissed, 134 
S. Ct. 636 (2013) (stating that a dwelling can be made otherwise unavailable to certain 
persons by actions that limit the availability of affordable housing). 
 267. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 268. See supra note 266. 
 269. Schneider, supra note 19, at 566. 
 270. Id.; see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,459, 11,466 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100.500). 
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Further, Professor Valerie Schneider argues that the language “adversely 
affect” simply would not make sense in the housing context: 
[T]he language of the Fair Housing Act would have been strange indeed if 
Congress had made it illegal to “adversely affect” an individual’s “status” 
as a potential homeowner or renter. . . . 
 [R]eading disparate impact analysis into Title VII and the ADEA 
simply because those statutes contain the word “affect” while the Fair 
Housing Act omits that word in favor of more descriptive language . . . is 
the most strained reading possible of the acts.  Indeed, no court has held 
that disparate impact claims must be based on the “adversely affect” 
phrase alone.271 
Thus, the difference in language between the FHA and Title VII is a 
product of necessarily different drafting techniques due to the subject matter 
being regulated and not based on different legislative intent. 
Proponents also address the narrow reading of the “because of” language 
found in the FHA.  The basic argument regarding this language is that a 
narrow reading would be incompatible with the broad purposes of the FHA 
and “effects” language discussed in the above paragraph.272  As early as 
1977, in Arlington Heights II, courts recognized the possibility that the 
“because of” language may be read narrowly to restrict the FHA’s 
application to actions that were motivated by unlawful considerations.273  
However, no circuit court or agency has found this language to be a barrier 
to disparate impact claims under the FHA.274  HUD argues explicitly that 
the use of the “because of” language in section 703(a)(2) of Title VII and 
section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA takes any force out of the argument that the 
“because of” language in the FHA requires that a defendant act with 
unlawful intent in order to be liable under the FHA.275 
HUD next argues that the legal definition of “discriminate”—a word 
found in section 804(b) of the FHA and elsewhere—also supports an 
interpretation of the FHA that authorizes disparate impact claims.276  In 
HUD’s implementation of 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, it argues that 
“‘[d]iscriminate’ is a term that may encompass actions that have a 
 
 271. Schneider, supra note 19, at 566. 
 272. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Rizzo and Arlington Heights II analysis of the 
“because of” language found in the FHA); see also Implementation of the Fair Housing 
Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,466 (concluding that the “because 
of” language does not preclude disparate impact claims, because the same language also 
appears in Title VII, section 703(a)(2), and ADEA, section 4(a)(2), which both authorize 
disparate impact claims). 
 273. See Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th Cir. 1977); accord Resident 
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 274. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 11,462; cf. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. 
Affairs, 747 F.3d 275, 280 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014) (collecting cases 
from ten circuit courts, which all have held that disparate impact claims are cognizable under 
the FHA). 
 275. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 11,466. 
 276. See infra notes 277–84. 
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discriminatory effect but not a discriminatory intent.”277  For support of this 
position, HUD cites two Supreme Court cases:  (1) Alexander v. Choate,278 
in which the Court “assum[ed] without deciding” that a statute that makes it 
illegal to “subject [an individual with a disability] to discrimination”279 
authorizes disparate impact claims;280 and (2) Board of Education v. 
Harris,281 in which the court held that the word “discriminate” in the 
Emergency School Authorization Act282 was ambiguous, and in 
consideration of the Act’s purpose, policy, legislative history, and text, 
could encompass a disparate impact test.283  HUD goes on to say that: 
HUD’s extensive experience in administering the Fair Housing 
Act . . . informs its conclusion that not only can the term “discriminate” 
be interpreted to encompass discriminatory effects liability, but it must be 
so interpreted in order to achieve the Act’s stated purpose to provide for 
fair housing to the extent the Constitution allows.284 
In addition, a quick look at the history of the legal definition of 
“discrimination” as found in previous editions of Black’s Law Dictionary 
shows that the definition of “discrimination” has not been static.  The term 
“discrimination” has been in Black’s Law Dictionary at least since its third 
edition, though early versions do not explicitly define discrimination in the 
civil rights context.285  The third edition defines discrimination as, “[i]n 
constitutional law, the effect of a statute which confers particular privileges 
on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons.”286  By the 
fourth revised edition, a new definition was included in addition to the 
language quoted above:  “[i]n general, a failure to treat all equally; 
favoritism.”287  The fifth edition added, for the first time, a definition that 
explicitly refers to discrimination in the civil rights context and which also 
includes disparate treatment language:  “[u]nfair treatment or denial of 
normal privileges to persons because of their race, age, nationality or 
religion.”288  This definition stayed constant through the sixth edition.289  
By the ninth edition, Black’s Law Dictionary abandoned the language “in 
constitutional law” and stated that “discrimination” means: 
 
 277. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 11,466. 
 278. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 279. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). 
 280. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 299. 
 281. 444 U.S. 130 (1979). 
 282. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1619 (1979). 
 283. Harris, 444 U.S. at 140–41. 
 284. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 11,466. 
 285. Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (3d ed. 1933) (citing Franchise Motor Freight 
Ass’n v. Seavey, 235 P. 1000, 1002 (Cal. 1925)). 
 286. Id. (emphasis added). 
 287. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (4th revised ed. 1968) (emphasis added). 
 288. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 420 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).  This edition also 
included an explanatory note that states that “[f]ederal statutes prohibit discrimination in 
employment on basis of [protected traits].” Id. (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964). 
 289. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (6th ed. 1990). 
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n., (1866) 1. The effect of a law or established practice that confers 
privileges on a certain class or that denies privileges to a certain class 
because of race, [and other protected classes]. . . . 2. Differential 
treatment; esp., a failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable 
distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored.290 
The entry then explains different kinds of discrimination, including race 
discrimination and sex discrimination.291  The ninth edition’s definition is 
interesting, because it adds civil rights–specific language in the definition 
that contains “effects” language and drops it from the section that contains 
the disparate treatment language.292 
In 2014, the tenth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary changed the 
definition of “discrimination” again, keeping all of the same language 
quoted from the ninth edition, but adding (as the first entry, in front of the 
above-quoted language), “1. The intellectual faculty of noting differences or 
similarities.”293  It also added a new subentry of interest:  “direct 
discrimination,” which means, “[d]ifferential treatment of a person or a 
particular group of people based on race, gender, or other characteristic.”294  
Finally, the tenth edition also includes another new entry, defining 
“discriminatory purpose,” which is a “design or desire to restrict the rights 
of a class of people, esp. a protected class.”295 
2.   The Opponents’ Arguments 
Those who oppose the theory that disparate impact claims are cognizable 
under the FHA obviously take a different approach. 
First, this side of the argument tends to put a lot of weight in the Supreme 
Court’s Smith v. City of Jackson decision, which reasoned that the 
“otherwise adversely affect” language, found in both Title VII and the 
ADEA, is the language which gives rise to disparate impact liability under 
those statutes.296  The basic argument here is that for a statute to authorize 
disparate impact claims, it must contain explicit “effects” language, such as 
the word “affect” or “results.”297  In American Insurance Ass’n v. U.S. 
Department of Housing & Urban Development, Judge Richard J. Leon 
expressed that “[i]t takes hutzpah (bordering on desperation)” for HUD to 
argue that the language of section 804(a) resembles the language of Title 
 
 290. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 535. 
 293. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (10th ed. 2014). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 567. 
 296. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Smith Court’s reasoning); cf. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 13-00966 (RJL), 2014 WL 5802283, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov. 
7, 2014) (“In short, Smith represents a sea change in approach to the analysis of statutory 
provisions with respect to disparate-impact liability. . . .”); Jensen & Naimon, supra note 
181, at 101–02. 
 297. See Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *9; Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 
104–05; cf. Schneider, supra note 19, at 544, 566 (arguing against the “textualist” position 
that the “magic” word “affects” is necessary for disparate impact claims to be cognizable 
under the FHA). 
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VII section 703(a)(2) and ADEA section 4(a)(2), when both of these 
provisions contain the “effects” language, and FHA section 804(a) does 
not.298 
Kirk D. Jensen and Jeffrey P. Naimon provide one of the more thorough 
arguments taking this approach.299  Relying on the reasoning in Smith, 
Jensen and Naimon argue that for a statute to authorize disparate impact 
claims, it must use the language “otherwise adversely affect” or “results 
in.”300  The authors point to five different statutes that contain this 
language, each of which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as 
authorizing disparate impact claims.301  They next list four statutes that 
follow some form of a “discriminate . . . because of” formulation, each of 
which has been held by the Supreme Court to authorize only disparate 
treatment claims.302  Thus, “when a statute contains language addressing 
the ‘effects’ or ‘results’ of an action, disparate impact claims under the 
statute are permitted.  When the statute lacks such ‘effects’ language, 
disparate impact claims under the statute are prohibited.”303 
Jensen and Naimon then apply this logic to the FHA.304  However, they 
do not apply this test to section 804(a), the statute usually cited as the one 
giving rise to disparate impact liability.305  Instead, Jensen and Naimon cite 
section 805(a)306 of the FHA, which reads:  “It shall be unlawful for any 
person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real 
estate–related transactions to discriminate against any person in making 
available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a 
transaction, because of race . . . .”307  Thus, the FHA provision that they 
analyze clearly contains the “discriminate . . . because of” formulation they 
are looking for to argue that the FHA does not authorize disparate impact 
claims. 
Second, the opponents of FHA disparate impact liability will also look to 
the “ordinary meaning” of “discriminate” to support their position.  As 
noted above, this approach is supported by Supreme Court precedent which 
requires the interpretation of a statute to begin with the assumption that 
Congress intended the words it used to have their ordinary meaning.308 
The “ordinary meaning” of “discriminate,” opponents argue, is some 
version of “to make a difference in treatment or favor on a class or 
categorical basis in disregard of individual merit.”309  The word “treatment” 
 
 298. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *9. 
 299. Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181. 
 300. Id. at 105. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 106. 
 303. Id. at 107. 
 304. Id. at 108. 
 305. E.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 
F.3d 275 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014). 
 306. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2012). 
 307. Id. § 3605(a). 
 308. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009). 
 309. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 13-00966 (RJL), 2014 WL 
5802283, at *8 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2014) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
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found in the dictionary definition of discriminate leads some commentators 
and at least one court to conclude that the word “discriminate” refers only 
to intentional discrimination, i.e., disparate treatment claims.310 
In addition to the ordinary meaning of “discriminate,” Jensen and 
Naimon also look to a legal interpretation of the word, found in the five-to-
four Supreme Court opinion, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of 
Education,311 which states that “‘[d]iscrimination’ is a term that covers a 
wide range of intentional unequal treatment. . . .”312 
Thus, opponents of the disparate impact liability standard under the FHA 
use a variety of interpretive tools to support their position.  All of these 
tools are used to determine the “ordinary meaning” of the text of the FHA, 
which, under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, is the goal in any 
statutory interpretation. 
E.   Applying Chevron to HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule 
This section describes the reasoning of the only two federal judges to 
apply the Chevron deference test to HUD’s disparate impact rule. 
Because the HUD disparate impact rule is so new, there is a dearth of 
court analysis applying the Chevron test to it.  As of the end of 2014, only a 
handful of cases have cited 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, most of which contain 
little or no discussion of the rule at all.313  Only two district court cases 
have actually applied the Chevron two-step test to § 100.500.314 
 
DICTIONARY (1966)); Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 110 (citing to a 2006 edition of a 
Random House Dictionary).  Jensen and Naimon also cite to an opinion for a five-Justice 
majority, written by Justice O’Connor in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 
U.S. 167, 175 (2005), and a law review article from 1983 discussing the Voting Rights Act 
and the conflation of the concepts of disparate treatment and disparate impact under that Act. 
See Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 110 n.38 (citing James F. Blumstein, Defining and 
Proving Race Discrimination:  Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the 
Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 635 (1983)). 
 310. See supra note 309. 
 311. 544 U.S. 167, 175 (2005). 
 312. Id.; see also Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 106 n.38. 
 313. Cf. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 
275, 282 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014) (discussing HUD’s authority to adopt 
rules implementing the FHA, and adopting the burden-shifting test in § 100.500 without any 
analysis of Chevron); Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *7 (vacating the rule, and 
finding that the rule fails on the first step of Chevron); Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. v. 
Donovan, No. 13 C 8564, 2014 WL 4377570, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2014) (applying the 
Chevron test and upholding the rule on the second step); Gabins v. City of Wilmington, No. 
14-043-GMS, 2014 WL 1370110, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 4, 2014) (citing § 100.500 as authority 
without discussion); Perdue v. City of Wilmington, No. 14-044-SLR, 2014 WL 5035938, at 
*1, 3–4 (D. Del. Oct. 8, 2014) (acknowledging alleged violation of § 100.500 without 
discussion); MHANY Mgmt. v. Inc. Vill. of Garden City, 985 F. Supp. 2d 390, 424 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing § 100.500 in passing, and applying the burden-shifting test found in 
Second Circuit case law).  Although this is not an exhaustive list, it is a representative 
sample of the treatment that the HUD rule has received in federal court decisions. 
 314. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *7; Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n of Am., 2014 WL 
4377570, at *24. 
2082 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
The first case to apply Chevron to HUD’s disparate impact rule was 
Property Casualty Insurers Ass’n of America v. Donovan.315  In Donovan, 
Judge Amy St. Eve of the Northern District of Illinois framed the question 
on the first step of Chevron as whether the FHA spoke directly to how a 
plaintiff should prove a discrimination claim under the FHA.316  The court 
found that the FHA was silent on this question.317 
The court then went on to Step Two of the Chevron analysis, which asks 
whether HUD’s disparate impact rule was a reasonable interpretation of the 
FHA.318  It found that HUD’s adoption of the three-step burden-shifting test 
was reasonable for several reasons.  First, the burden-shifting framework is 
very similar to the frameworks already developed by the courts for deciding 
disparate impact claims under the FHA.319  Second, the court noted that the 
burden-shifting test adopted by HUD and the burden-shifting test adopted 
by Congress in Title VII, are similar and that “[c]ourts have repeatedly 
turned to Title VII precedent for guidance evaluating disparate impact 
liability under the FHA (Title VIII) and vice versa.”320  Third, HUD’s rule 
was a “reasonable accommodation of the competing interests at stake,” that 
is, the interest of plaintiffs and the government in eliminating 
discriminatory housing practices and the interest of defendants in avoiding 
frivolous litigation.321 
The next case to apply the Chevron two-step test to § 100.500 was 
American Insurance Ass’n.  In this instance, Judge Leon of the D.C. District 
Court found that the HUD rule failed the Chevron test at Step One, because 
the FHA “unambiguously prohibits only intentional discrimination.”322  
Much of this argument already has been laid out in Part II.C.2, so only a 
brief reiteration and a short supplement to the argument is required to show 
how this reasoning is applied in the Chevron test. 
Judge Leon began his analysis by stating that Smith “made clear” that a 
statute does not authorize disparate impact claims unless there is “clear 
language to that effect.”323 
He then turned to the dictionary meaning of a handful of words found in 
the section 804(a) of the FHA, as defined by a 1966 edition of Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary.324  Each definition is important and is 
analyzed further in Part III of this Note.325  He defined “refuse” as “to show 
 
 315. Cf. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n of Am., 2014 WL 4377570, at *24. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at *25. 
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 325. See infra Part III.B. 
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or express a positive unwillingness to do or comply with.”326  He then 
defined “make,” found in the phrase “otherwise make unavailable or 
deny,”327 as “‘to produce as a result of action, effort, or behavior’ or ‘to 
cause to happen to or be experienced by someone.’”328  “Deny” in the last 
phrase means “‘to refuse to grant’ or ‘to turn down or give a negative 
answer to.’”329  Finally, “discriminate” is given very much the same 
meaning described above,330 which is essentially to treat persons differently 
on a categorical basis, without regard to merit.331 
Judge Leon reasoned that the definitions of these words—“refuse,” 
“make,” “deny,” and “discriminate”—all point to requiring a potential 
defendant to take intentional discriminatory actions.332 
Next, Judge Leon pointed to the FHA’s lack of the “effects” language 
that Title VII and the ADEA include.333  The absence of the clear “effects” 
language, mixed with the “because of race” formulation334 found in the 
FHA, also led Judge Leon to conclude that the provisions found in the FHA 
do not resemble the disparate impact provisions of Title VII and the 
ADEA.335  Not only is the language in section 804(a) different from the 
disparate impact provisions of Title VII and the ADEA, but “[t]he statutory 
language in [section 804(a)] is materially identical to the statutory language 
used in the disparate-treatment prohibitions in Title VII and the ADEA.”336 
For these reasons, Judge Leon reasoned that Congress, when it wrote the 
FHA, spoke directly on the issue of whether disparate impact claims could 
be brought under the Act.337  He concluded that Congress explicitly 
precluded such claims by the plain language of the statute.338 
It should be noted that Judges St. Eve and Leon asked slightly different 
questions during their Chevron analyses.  On Step One of Chevron, Judge 
St. Eve asked in Donovan whether the FHA spoke directly to how a 
plaintiff should prove his or her discrimination claim.339  Judge Leon, on 
the other hand, asked the narrower question—and the one that is before the 
Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities—that is, whether the FHA spoke 
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directly to the issue of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable 
under the Act.340 
III.   THE FAIR HOUSING ACT HAS NO (ORDINARY) MEANING:  
WHY THE COURT SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE TO HUD’S INTERPRETATION 
Part III of this Note argues that HUD’s disparate impact rule should be 
upheld under a Chevron analysis, at least as it pertains to section 804(a) 
and (b) of the FHA, because:  (1) the text of the FHA is silent as to the 
availability of disparate impact claims and (2) a reading of the FHA that 
authorizes disparate impact claims is reasonable. 
To support this conclusion, this part first argues that judicial precedent 
alone cannot be relied upon to support such a reading, because many early 
cases relied upon constitutional equal protection disparate impact cases that 
were invalidated or abrogated by the Supreme Court.  Many modern cases 
continue to cite these early cases as support for the conclusion that disparate 
impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, weakening the foundation of 
this claim. 
Next, Part III argues that the text of the FHA is silent or ambiguous as to 
the availability of disparate impact claims under the FHA, and thus, HUD’s 
disparate impact rule passes Chevron Step One.  This part reaches this 
conclusion by reviewing the reasoning for and against disparate impact 
liability under the FHA and ultimately concludes that neither side of the 
argument is wholly satisfactory.  Finally, this part argues that under 
Chevron Step Two, HUD’s disparate impact rule is a reasonable 
interpretation of the Act. 
A.   A “Derelict on the Waters of the Law” 
In spite of forty years of nearly unanimous judicial precedent supporting 
a disparate impact standard under the FHA, this precedent alone is not 
sufficient to definitively say that the disparate impact standard should be 
allowed under the Act.  This is true for two compelling reasons:  (1) the 
heavy reliance of early FHA disparate impact cases on invalid equal 
protection precedent341 and (2) a lack of statutory analysis in these early 
cases.342  This second point is especially troubling, as the Supreme Court 
often closely ties its holdings in cases interpreting civil rights statutes to the 
text of the statute in question.343 
As this Note discusses, the Supreme Court’s rejection of the disparate 
impact standard in constitutional equal protection cases made the holdings 
in early cases such as Black Jack, Arlington Heights II, and Rizzo less 
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2015] DEFERRING TO HUD’S DISPARATE IMPACT RULE 2085 
authoritative.344  Courts continue to cite these cases as authority, making 
their holdings less robust and somewhat hollow. 
The continued citation of these cases as direct support for the rule that 
disparate impact cases are cognizable under the FHA is not necessarily 
wrong and does not make the holdings in these cases per se invalid.  
However, it leaves a logical lacuna in the argument that can only be filled 
by close adherence to the text of the statute itself, or better yet, an 
authoritative interpretation by HUD, codified in a rule promulgated with 
rulemaking power under the APA.345 
HUD’s disparate impact rule, § 100.500, might be able to fill this void, 
because the rule has the benefit of Chevron deference.346  That is, 
proponents of the disparate impact standard of liability under the FHA need 
not prove that the statutory text plainly lends itself to such a reading but 
only that the FHA is silent or ambiguous as to the standard, and that the 
HUD rule is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.347 
This essentially has the effect of lowering the proponents’ burden of 
persuasion when a disparate impact claim is under judicial review.  
Theoretically, this also should be the case in Inclusive Communities. 
B.   A Close Analysis of the Text Shows That the Statute Is Ambiguous 
The debate over whether the plain meaning of the text of the FHA 
supports disparate impact liability only goes to prove that the text of the 
statute is ambiguous.  This section first addresses the unreliability of the use 
of dictionaries to determine the plain meaning of the text—specifically the 
use of dictionaries in American Insurance Ass’n.  Then, this section 
explains how the structure of section 804(a) straddles the middle ground 
between Title VII section 703(a)(1) (the disparate treatment provision) and 
(a)(2) (the disparate impact provision).  Finally, this section argues that the 
reasoning of Smith and Gross is inconclusive when applied to the FHA, 
largely because of significant structural differences between the FHA and 
Title VII. 
1.   The Use of Dictionaries Is Inconclusive 
Courts and commentators sometimes use dictionaries to decipher the 
plain meaning of a statute.348  This is especially unhelpful in the context of 
the FHA.  Recall, for example, the discussion of Judge Leon’s use of 
dictionaries in American Insurance Ass’n.349  Judge Leon lists a string of 
words and definitions, and simply concludes that they all point to 
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“intentional” conduct, without any real explanation of how that inference is 
made.350 
First, the definitions of “refuse” and “deny” used by Judge Leon are 
neutral regarding an actor’s intent.  The definition of “refuse” is essentially 
a positive unwillingness to do or comply with.351  The definition of “deny” 
is essentially “to refuse” or to give a negative answer to.352  These 
definitions speak only to actions in themselves and do not so much as hint 
at motivation, purpose, or treatment based on categorical bias.  When the 
words are viewed within their statutory context, this neutrality becomes 
even more clear:  “refuse”—as in “refuse to sell or rent”—and “deny”—as 
in “deny[] a dwelling”353—are simply verbs that describe an adverse action 
or injury-causing outcome. 
Second, the definition of “make”—as in the phrase “or otherwise make 
unavailable . . . a dwelling”—that Judge Leon cites is similarly neutral.  In 
fact, if the definition of “make” weighs in favor of either side of the 
disparate impact debate, it weighs in favor of the proponents’ interpretation 
of the FHA.  Judge Leon defines “make” as “‘to produce as a result of 
action, effort, or behavior’ or ‘to cause to happen to or be experienced by 
someone.’”354  Such a definition has the “results”-based language that 
according to Jensen and Naimon,355 creates disparate impact liability in 
civil rights statutes.  The presence of the word “results” in the dictionary 
definition of “make” has as much persuasive force as the presence of the 
word “treatment” in the common usage dictionary definition of 
“discriminate.”356  Realistically, the presence of either of these words in 
their respective definitions is probably not indicative of Congress’s intent 
when it included the words “make” and “discriminate” in the various 
provisions of the FHA. 
Moreover, the use of the passive voice in the phrase “to cause to happen 
to or be experienced by” clearly indicates a focus on the effect of an act, not 
on the actor’s motivations.  Last, it is significant that the word “make,” with 
the built-in results-based definition, is found in exactly the phrase that 
proponents of the disparate impact standard argue is the effects-based 
language in the FHA—that is, “otherwise make unavailable or deny.”357 
Finally, the word “discriminate,” found in section 804(b) of the FHA, 
also does not connote a requirement that a defendant act with the intention 
of discriminating.  This is made clear by the brief account of the historical 
development of the legal definition of the word “discrimination,” which 
explicitly included both disparate effect and treatment language at least 
thirty-five years prior to the passage of the FHA and continues to contain 
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the same definitions today, forty years after the passage of the FHA.358  The 
fact that a dictionary of common usage such as Webster’s Third359 does not 
include a definition of disparate impact discrimination is hardly surprising.  
And any force that the disparate treatment language in such dictionaries had 
in cutting against the availability of disparate impact claims under the FHA 
is altogether neutralized by the legal definition of “discriminate.” 
This account of the plain meaning of the text of the FHA does not mean 
that the plain meaning of the FHA authorizes disparate impact claims.  To 
the contrary, the “plain meaning” of the FHA is unascertainable as it 
pertains to the cognizability of disparate impact claims under the Act.  That 
is to say that the FHA is silent or ambiguous regarding this particular issue.  
For practitioners, judges, or commentators to claim to be able to discern the 
“true” meaning of the statute, or the true intent of Congress, as it pertains to 
this issue, based only on the text of the statute, is to promote a fiction of the 
highest order. 
2.   The Structure of the Statute Also Is Inconclusive and Seems to Place 
Section 804(a) Somewhere Between Section 703(a)(1) and (a)(2) 
Since we cannot rely on the plain meaning of the statute to determine 
whether the FHA authorizes disparate impact claims, this Note now turns to 
the structure of section 803(a) and (b) as they compare to Title VII section 
703(a)(1) and (a)(2). 
Refer back to the full text of the relevant Title VII and FHA provisions 
reproduced earlier.360  One can see that, simply stated, the structure of the 
section 703(a)(1) follows this basic outline:  it is unlawful “to fail or refuse 
to hire . . . or otherwise to discriminate . . . because of race. . . .”361  Section 
703(a)(2) follows a slightly different outline:  it is unlawful “to limit, 
segregate, or classify . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive . . . or otherwise adversely affect [a person’s employment status] 
because of race. . . .”362 
Section 804(a) of the FHA begins in a similar manner as section 
703(a)(1), by stating that it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent . . . or to 
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of” a dwelling “because of race.”363  
But it also makes it unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable or deny” a 
dwelling because of race.364  As explained earlier, “otherwise make 
unavailable” may be read as results or effects language and thus as 
authorizing disparate impact claims.365 
In fact, proponents of the disparate impact standard argue that this 
language is parallel to the “otherwise affect” language found in section 
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703(a)(2).366  It is the act of making a dwelling unavailable that is the 
undesired effect.  Section 703(a)(2) necessarily used the more general word 
“affect” because the adverse effects in an employment context are naturally 
more varied—that is, they could include a failure to hire, failure to promote, 
firing, unequal pay, et cetera.  The phrase “otherwise make unavailable” can 
plausibly be read as the more specific parallel of the phrase “otherwise 
adversely affect.” 
However, “otherwise make unavailable or deny” is not definitively 
“effects” language.  It does not include explicit “effects” language like the 
words “affect” or “results”—language the Supreme Court specifically 
focuses on when determining whether a civil rights statute authorizes 
disparate impact claims. 
A discussion of the “because of” language here does not add much at all.  
The phrase “because of race” appears in both the disparate treatment and 
disparate impact provisions of Title VII.  It is clear that, although the 
“because of” language can be read narrowly to create liability only for 
disparate treatment claims, when there is language in the statute that is 
sufficient to indicate liability for disparate impact, the disparate treatment 
feel of the “because of” language gives way to a disparate impact standard. 
3.   Smith and Gross Are Also Inconclusive Regarding 
the Availability of Disparate Impact Claims Under the FHA 
Both Smith and Gross are helpful guidance in reading the text of the FHA 
and even offer some guidance on how to interpret the structure of the 
individual statutes.  However, neither is quite the “sea change”367 in 
statutory construction that opponents of disparate impact liability make it 
out to be. 
First, the plurality’s statutory analysis in Smith interprets language that is 
not found anywhere in the FHA—that is, the “otherwise adversely affect” 
language.368  However, Smith is important, because for the first time it 
makes explicit which provision of Title VII (and the ADEA) gives rise to 
disparate impact liability—section 703(a)(2).  Therefore, it gives scholars 
and practitioners some guidance on what kind of language will give rise to 
disparate impact liability based on the plain language of the statute.  And, 
while it does not limit the language that gives rise to disparate impact 
liability only to that language, it does explicitly hold that the language in 
section 703(a)(1) only authorizes disparate treatment claims. 
Gross is helpful as well because it interprets the “because of” language 
that is also found in the FHA.  Gross held that the “because of” language in 
the disparate treatment provision of the ADEA required that a claimant’s 
protected status be a but-for cause of the disparate treatment.369  This is a 
strict reading of this language, but it is still not determinative of whether the 
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FHA authorizes disparate impact claims.  As indicated above, the “because 
of” language has a very different effect on the rest of the statute if the 
balance of the statutory language lends itself to a disparate impact reading. 
Thus, considering the language and structure of the FHA, as well as the 
recent Supreme Court cases that have called into question the past forty 
years of case history surrounding disparate impact liability under the Act, 
the only clear conclusion that can be made about the FHA is that the FHA is 
silent, or at least ambiguous, as to whether disparate impact claims are 
cognizable under the Act. 
C.   The HUD Rule Is a Reasonable Interpretation of the FHA 
This section argues that, under Chevron Step Two, HUD’s disparate 
impact rule is reasonable and that courts should defer to the expertise of 
HUD in deciding whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the 
FHA. 
That the HUD rule is reasonable does not seem contentious.  It did not 
create new liabilities, but rather clarified doctrine that had organically 
developed in nearly every circuit court in the United States.370  
Furthermore, as Judge St. Eve noted in Donovan,371 the burden-shifting test 
that HUD adopted is similar to the tests that were already being applied by 
the courts and is also very similar to the burden-shifting test under Title 
VII.372 
HUD is also best equipped to determine whether the disparate impact 
standard is essential to accomplishing the broad remedial purposes of the 
FHA—that is, ending, ameliorating, and preventing segregation and 
housing discrimination.373  HUD has the benefit of having observed, 
studied, and participated in forty years of disparate impact litigation under 
the FHA.  And while the case law is not the most well-reasoned precedent 
to rely upon for finding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under 
the Act, it gives HUD the advantage of knowing in advance how its 
interpretation will affect such concerns as:  the breadth of liability, the 
likelihood of frivolous claims, and, most importantly, the efficacy of the 
disparate impact standard in accomplishing the goals of the FHA. 
CONCLUSION 
The HUD disparate impact rule, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, essentially saves 
the FHA disparate impact standard from an uncertain fate.  There is an 
essential flaw in the FHA’s judicial precedent regarding disparate impact 
claims that has not been properly dealt with.  Thus, the availability of 
disparate impact claims under the FHA must rest on the text of the statute 
itself or an interpretation of the statute by an expert such as HUD.  The 
HUD rule essentially fills the void that the judicial precedent and 
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ambiguous language leaves by offering the disparate impact standard 
enough protection to withstand judicial review by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
